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REVISED ARTICLE 9, THE PROPOSED
 
BANKRUPTCY CODE AMENDMENTS AND
 
SECURITIZING DEBTORS AND THEIR
 
CREDITORS
 
Lois R. Lupica" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is a result of a Conference, appropriately titled 
Two Shocks to the Bankruptcy System.' The Conference title 
recognizes that the revisions made to Article 9,' and the proposed 
Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S. 1981, Cornell 
University; J.D. 1987, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to Edward 
J. Janger, David Nowlin, Thomas M. Ward, and Jennifer Wriggins for reading 
and commenting on earlier drafts of this Article. 
1. This paper is a result of the remarks made by the author at the 
Symposium entitled Two Shocks to the Bankruptcy System: Revised UCC 
Article 9 and the Pending Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, Where Do We Go 
From Here? held at Fordham University School of Law on November 15, 2001. 
2. U.C.C. §§ 9-101- 9-709 (revised 1999). Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code ("UCC") deals with debt collateral and secured transactions. 
See Lawrence R. Ahem, III, "Workouts" Under Revised Article 9: A Review of 
Changes and Proposalfor Study, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 115, 116 (2001) 
("Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs the creation, perfection, 
priority and enforcement of consensual security interests in personal property 
and fixtures, as well as most consignments of personal property and sales of 
certain types of intangible personal property."). Article 9 was revised in 1999 
("Revised Article 9" or "Article 9"), and has been adopted uniformly by all U.S. 
states. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
States Uniformly EnactArticle 9 Revisions, July 2001, at 
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/prl-07-01.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 
2002). See generally Ingrid Michelson Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, 2001: A 
Code Odyssey (New Dawn for the Article 9 Creditor), 106 CoM. L.J. 105 (2001) 
(discussing the key changes; "[m]any trees have died and many CLE credits have 
already been earned in the name of understanding Revised Article 9"). Article 
9's recent revision have major implications for the financial world. See id. at 105­
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changes to the Bankruptcy Code,3 if enacted, will have a significant 
impact on firms and their creditors in bankruptcy. The Panel I 
participated in further recognized the impact these revisions and 
proposed changes will have on securitization originators in 
bankruptcy, as well as on their creditors.' Indeed, many of these 
statutory changes are specifically designed to enhance the rights of 
secured creditors, as well as the rights of securitization transaction 
participants, once a debtor files for bankruptcy.' 
The central theme that runs through Revised Article 9 is the 
facilitation of secured credit. It is now easier for creditors to 
encumber a greater number and variety of types of assets. 6 
06. 
3. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
4. Securitization, also known as structured financing, is the method of 
finance whereby a debtor transfers certain assets with a cash flow to a special 
purpose corporation ("SPC"); the SPC in turn transforms the cash flows into 
securities. See generally Glenn B. McClelland, Jr. & James W. McDonald, Jr., 
Securitizing Trade and Lease Receivables, in THE ASSET SECURITIZATION 
HANDBOOK 123, 130 (Phillip L. Zweig ed., 1989). These securities, known as 
asset-backed securities ("ABS"), are then sold to private or public investors. See 
id. Securitization remains the fastest growing sector in the capital markets, and 
there are currently about $185 billion ABS outstanding. Id. Commonly, 
originators securitize their assets to obtain certain advantages over alternative 
financing methods. See id. These advantages include improved liquidity, 
improved risk management, accounting-related benefits, and the ability to raise 
funds at a lower effective interest rate. 
5. See G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and 
Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 3 (2001) (discussing those changes in 
Article 9 that will significantly strengthen the rights of secured creditors in 
bankruptcy cases). 
6. As noted in the PEB Commentary: 
[One could ask] ... whether Article 9 should limit the types of property that 
can be subjected to a security interest or the extent to which a debtor's property 
can be so encumbered or one might question whether any perfection step 
should be necessary to obtain priority over judicial lien creditors or other 
competing claimants. Or one might question whether security interests ought 
to be enforceable at all. 
Although it is well aware of challenges to the validity of some basic principles 
[underlying] Article 9, the Committee chose not to undertake a thorough 
reexamination of those principles. Nor did the Committee's deliberations 
reflect strong support for making major adjustments in the balance that Article 
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Correspondingly, the revisions to Article 9 do much to enhance the 
certainty with which originators are able to securitize a greater 
number of types of assets.7 The ongoing debate in the academic 
literature, concerning both the economic efficiency of secured 
credit and the normative implications of secured creditors' priority 
over unsecured creditors,' has spilled over to a debate about the 
efficiency and normative effects of securitization.9 
9 now strikes between secured parties and unsecured creditors. But insofar as 
the Committee's recommendations would make it easier and less costly to take 
and perfect security interests, they are likely to have the effect of improving the 
position of secured parties relative to that of unsecured creditors . . . . The 
Committee believes that any necessary adjustments for the protection of third 
parties should be made directly, as by changing Article 9's priority rules or by 
modifying the avoidance powers or other distributional rules of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and not indirectly, as by increasing the difficulty and expense of creating 
perfected security interests. 
PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE U.C.C. ARTICLE 
9 at 8-9 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter PEB STUDY]; see also James J. White, Work 
and Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 2089 (1994) (declaring that the 
efficiency of Article 9 is irrelevant to the revision process); Steven L. Harris & 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee Report. Strong Signals 
and HardChoices,29 IDAHO L. REv. 561, 562 (1993) ("Article 9 represents what 
many believe to be a grand victory for secured parties."). 
7. See, e.g., Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 105-06 ("The revisions 
significantly expand Article 9's scope . . . ."); Terry M. Anderson et al., 
Attachment and Perfection of Security Interests Under Revised Article 9: A "Nuts 
and Bolts" Primer,9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 179, 181 (2001) (writing that 
"[tihe Revision will expand the scope of Article 9 to include transactions and 
types of personal property previously not covered"). 
8. See, e.g., Symposium: The Priorityof Secured Debt, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 
1279 (1997); Lucian A. Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the 
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994); Alan 
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current 
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with 
Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full PriorityDebates,82 CORNELL L. REv. 
1373 (1997). 
9. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1064 (1998) (arguing that because debtor retains 
some residual interest in assets sold in connection with a securitization, such 
assets should properly be returned to debtor's estate upon a bankruptcy filing); 
see also Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk 
Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REv. 101, 128-29 (1997) (describing the costs and benefits 
of securitization); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23­
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Notwithstanding this debate, Revised Article 9 not only 
reflects the drafters' affirmative decision to further enhance 
°secured creditors' rights," it also includes myriad provisions 
designed to facilitate securitization transactions." Because 
bankruptcy law looks to Article 9 to determine the rights of 
creditors and transferees with respect to personal property,2 the 
changes to Article 9 enhancing the rights and interests of creditors 
as well as asset-backed security transferees are, in effect, changes 
in bankruptcy law. The question raised by these Article 9 revisions 
as well as by the proposed change in the Bankruptcy Code, is 
31 (1996) (noting that securitization may be used as a strategy for judgment 
proofing); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing,51 
STAN. L. REv. 147, 149 (1998) (exploring the difficulties involved in judgment-
proofing large businesses); Lynn M. LoPucki, The IrrefutableLogic of Judgment 
Proofing:A Reply to ProfessorSchwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55 (1999) (defending 
the efficacy of judgment proofing); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The 
Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1998) (discussing the 
impact of securitization on a securitizing debtor's unsecured creditors); Lois R. 
Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory 
Institutionalizationof Securitization,33 CONN. L. REV. 199 (2000) (describing 
the effect of Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy Code revisions on the 
securitization and credit markets); Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, 
Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REv. 287 (2001) (discussing the impact of commercial law reforms on securitizing 
originators and their creditors in bankruptcy); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent 
Irrationalityof Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1999) (arguing that 
widespread use of securitization as a judgment proofing technique is unlikely); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Judgment Proofing:A Rejoinder,52 STAN. L. REv. 77 (1999) 
(writing that asset securitization is unlikely to cause the "death of liability"); 
Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations,7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 301 (2002). 
10. For the drafters' intent, see Ahern, supra note 2, at 116, 118-21 (noting 
that the "fundamental ways [in which] the drafters have recalibrated the parties' 
rights" promise to "increase secured creditors' leverage substantially, both before 
and after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy"). Professor Barry Zaretsky 
referred to the Article 9 revision as a "love feast for secured creditors." JULIAN 
B. MCDONNELL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANALYSIS OF REVISED ARTICLE 
92 (1999). 
11. See generally Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and 
the Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9. 
12. Article 9 "primarily sets out rules defining rights of a secured party 
against persons dealing with the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-102 (2001). 
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whether these changes are consistent with our historical 
understanding of bankruptcy policy. 
There are (at least) two views of bankruptcy. One view sees 
asset value maximization and asset distribution as the twin goals of 
the bankruptcy process." This vision of bankruptcy recognizes the 
value of bankruptcy outcomes tracking non-bankruptcy outcomes, 
and concedes that a property right redistribution in bankruptcy 
should be had only when a divergence from non-bankruptcy rules 
would result in an enhancement of estate value.4 An alternative 
vision of bankruptcy attaches importance to not only economic 
efficiency, but normative concerns such as distributional fairness 
among creditors and other stakeholders." Under this view, 
bankruptcy should have the effect of altering non-bankruptcy 
rights when such alterations further these normative goals. 6 
Moreover, the reorganization of viable businesses ought to be 
encouraged by the bankruptcy process, for the benefit of the 
debtor as well as the full array of stakeholders with an interest in 
the debtor's continued viability.'7 
Revised Article 9 is not consistent with bankruptcy policy 
under either view. The Bankruptcy Code, with its deference to 
non-bankruptcy-created property rights," was drafted at a time 
13. See generally, Lupica, Asset Securitization,supra note 9 (detailing the 
equitable powers of courts under the Bankruptcy Code). 
14. Id. at 656. 
15. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 
775 (1987). 
16. Id. at 785-94. The author lists five main rationales that bankruptcy law 
takes into account when deciding how to distribute the loss, most of which reflect 
fairness (rather than efficiency) values; e.g., the first rationale is "[r]elative ability 
to bear the costs of default." Id. at 790-94. 
17. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Symposium: Harmonizing the Business 
Bankruptcy Systems of Developed and Developing Nations: Some Issues, 17 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 473, 475-76 (1997) (though "[k]eeping corpses 
breathing on expensive life support technology will adversely affect credit 
markets... [the] long term view .. . [should] allow[] a reasonable, controlled 
chance for reorganization of [viable businesses]"). 
18. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets 
the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and Impact, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 85, 87 
(2001) (referring to "the Bankruptcy Code's overarching respect for 
nonbankruptcy law's allocation of rights with respect to particular assets in which 
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when old Article 9 was the law governing security interests.19 
While many have taken issue with the distributive scheme in 
°
bankruptcy under old Article 9,2 it was that system that was 
considered by Congress in its drafting of the substance and 
contours of bankruptcy law.2 Revised Article 9, however, is a 
significant departure from old Article 9.22 Bankruptcy outcomes 
are altered to the extent that non-bankruptcy-law-created property 
rights are changed,' 23thereby upsetting the expectations in place at 
the time the Bankruptcy Code was drafted. Moreover, the change 
proposed to the definition of "estate" in the Bankruptcy Code,2' if 
enacted, will in many cases result in a substantial divergence in 
creditors' rights and the value of their interests, depending upon 
whether the creditor's debtor is or is not in bankruptcy. 
Concerns regarding distributional fairness in bankruptcy are 
sharpened when what is being examined is the impact of a 
securitization transaction on a debtor-in-bankruptcy's unsecured 
creditors. Unlike in a secured lending context, when interests in 
the bankruptcy debtor has an interest ....Indeed, nonbankruptcy law's 
allocation of property interests lies at the core of the Bankruptcy Code's 
provisions for allocating value between the debtor and its creditors"). 
19. Id. at 91-92. 
20. For support of this point of view, as well as a summary of the entire 
debate, see Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and 
Bankruptcy:A Reply to Warren, 54 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987). 
21. 	 See, e.g., Warren, supranote 15, at 788 (noting that: 
Congressional comments on the Bankruptcy Code are liberally sprinkled with 
discussions of policies to 'protect the investing public, protect jobs, and help 
save troubled businesses,' of concern about the community impact of 
bankruptcy, and of 'the public interest' beyond the interests of the disputing 
parties. These comments serve as reminders that Congress intended 
bankruptcy law to address concerns broader than the immediate problems of 
debtors and their identified creditors.); 
see also Kathryn R. Heidt, Interest Under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: 
The Right, the Rate and the Relationship to Bankruptcy Policy, 1991 UTAH L. 
REv. 361, 385-86 (1991) (citing with approval Professor Warren's view that, in 
light of the legislative history, "bankruptcy law is a general distributive 
scheme ...[with] the underlying purpose [that] is more complex than the simple 
notion of streamlining the enforcement of state-created rights. Rather, 
bankruptcy law redistributes losses resulting from a business failure"). 
22. E.g., Lupica, Circumvention,supranote 9, at 235. 
23. See Warner, supranote 5, at 4-5. 
24. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
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collateral are still included in a debtor's bankruptcy estate, the goal 
of the securitization transaction parties is to remove the securitized 
assets from the bankruptcy estate.2 Following a securitization and 
upon a subsequent liquidation, fewer unencumbered assets may 
remain in the debtor's bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the 
debtor's residual creditors. 26
Moreover, a bankruptcy debtor who has securitized its assets 
may have a diminished ability to reorganize due to the dearth of 
cash collateral. Experience has shown that a firm with a higher
"going concern" value than its liquidation value is worth preserving 
for the benefit of the debtor, as well as for all of the debtor's 
creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers.' 28 If such a 
securitizing debtor finds itself without the cash necessary to sustain 
itself while it is formulating a reorganization plan, then a 
reorganization may not be tenable - leaving liquidation as the 
debtor's only alternative.' 28 This frustrates the long-standing 
bankruptcy policy of promoting the reorganization of viable 
businesses. 29
Whether 
financing method is a good thing among both large and small firms, 
remains unproven. What is clear, however, is that the revisions 
made to Article 9 impacting securitization will alter bankruptcy 
outcomes, arguably in ways that are inconsistent with bankruptcy 
an increase in the proliferation of securitization as a 
25. See, e.g., Carlson, supranote 9, at 1056 ("The form of the transfer.., is 
supposed to... [ensure] that no bankruptcy court can ever claim jurisdiction over 
the assets again."). 
26. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the 
Bankruptcy Dynamic,supranote 9, at 314. 
27. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 101 (1997) (discussing 
how viewing the bankruptcy process from the "strongest and most powerful" 
creditors' perspective "addresses only a limited number of those affected by a 
bankruptcy filing. It fails to take into account the myriad parties touched by a 
bankruptcy case and the economic consequences of their situations"). 
28. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the 
Bankruptcy Dynamic,supranote 9, at 291. 
29. See In re Gathering Rest., Inc., 79 B.R. 992, 999 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) 
("In the context of a bankruptcy case . . . the public interest ... means the 
promoting of a successful reorganization which should be one of the paramount 
concerns of a bankruptcy court" (quoting In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 B.R. 1018, 
1021 (D.N.M. 1982))). 
25
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policy." Moreover, Section 912 of the bankruptcy reform 
legislation provides an inordinate degree of protection and 
immunity from the normal operation of the bankruptcy system for 
participants in the structured finance market." This favored 
treatment appears to come at the expense of other creditors and 
debtors who seek to reorganize under the shelter of the bankruptcy 
laws.32 
II. CONCERNS OF SECURITIZATION ORIGINATORS AND OTHER
 
PARTIES TO ABS TRANSACTIONS THAT LED TO CHANGES TO
 
ARTICLE 9 AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
 
When old Article 933 was first enacted, the securitization 
market as currently constituted did not exist.34 Many assets 
30. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 5, at 5-6 (concluding that neither of the new 
revisions, while dramatically changing the landscape of debtor-creditor law, 
accords with any one of the two policy views of bankruptcy); see also id. at 84. 
31. See, e.g., Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the 
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, 321 n.189 (citing a comment by Professor 
Kenneth Klee to Professor Thomas Ward that Section 912 is supported and 
lobbied for by certain bond rating agencies and law firms that provide "true sale 
opinions"); see also David E. Rovella, Enron's Troubles May Spur Reform, Stall 
Deregulation,N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 2002, at 1 (mentioning a letter, signed by thirty-
five bankruptcy and commercial law professors and addressed to the chairmen of 
the Senate and House judiciary committees, arguing that if enacted, Section 912 
will make it easier for companies like Enron to use asset-backed securitization to 
shield assets from creditors in bankruptcy). 
32. See generally Warner, supra note 5; see also Rovella, supra note 31, at 1 
(noting the Enron fiasco). 
33. Pre-revision Article 9 shall be referred to in this Article as old Article 9. 
34. Securitization's roots are found in the ancient financing method known as 
factoring. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED 
FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION, 
6.2 (1991 & 1994 Supp.). Factoring came into its own in the 14th century English 
textile industry, and involved the discounted sale of accounts to a third party. Id. 
at 6.2, 6.3. Commonly, the factor both purchases the accounts, and analyzes the 
account debtor's credit. See SUSAN CRICHTON & CHARLES FERRIER, 
UNDERSTANDING FACTORING AND TRADE CREDIT 7-9, 22-26 (1986). While old 
Article 9 did include within its scope the governance of the common commercial 
practice of account-based financing, including factoring, the variety of assets 
currently securitized, coupled with the complexity of the transactions, it left many 
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commonly securitized today were not included within old Article 
59's definition of "account., 3 Moreover, it was not always clear 
how to classify securitized assets under old Article 9.36 Arguably 
many such assets, i.e., licensing receivables and credit card 
receivables, could be properly classified as either "accounts,"
"general intangibles" or, in some cases, "instruments."37 This 
uncertainty posed a problem for securitizers and their transferees 
because only sales of accounts and chattel paper" fell within old 
Article 9's reach.39  As such, the securitization of general 
intangibles and instruments relegated these transferees to non-
Article 9 law (state common law or remnants of pre-UCC accounts 
receivable statutes) to determine their rights and responsibilities. 
Moreover, predicting the judicial characterization of the asset 
securitizations beyond the reach of old Article 9. 
35. Old Article 9 defined accounts as "any right to payment for goods sold or 
leased or for services rendered, which is not evidenced by an instrument or 
chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 
(1995). Old Article 9 recognizes that the distinction between asset sales and 
assets transferred as collateral was often blurred in practice, and as such, a 
distinction between the two was not made in the statute for purposes of the 
notice requirement. Id. § 9-102(1)(b). 
36. See Stephen L. Sepinuck, Classifying Credit Card Receivables Under the 
U C.C.: Playingwith Instruments?,32 ARIZ. L. REv. 789 (1990). 
37. See generally id. 
38. Chattel paper is defined as "a writing or writings which evidence both a 
monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods." 
U.C.C. § 9-105 (1)(b) (1995). 
39. Securitization of general intangibles and instruments relegated 
transferees to non-Article 9 law (namely, state common law or remnants of pre-
U.C.C. accounts receivable statutes) to determine their rights and 
responsibilities. (Notably, if proper non-Article 9 steps to perfect under the 
properly applicable non-Article 9 law, if any, are taken, the transferor's trustee in 
bankruptcy will not be able to defeat the transferee's interest. Discovery of and 
compliance with the appropriate governing law, however, may not be a simple 
matter. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000) (describing scope of the trustee in bankruptcy's 
powers)). See Jeffrey E. Bjork, Seeking Predictability in Bankruptcy: An 
Alternative to Judicial Recharacterizationin Structured Financing, 14 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 119, 122 (1997) (pointing out that "[a] lack of certainty with respect to 
how the transaction may be characterized will almost assuredly reduce, if not 
destroy, the market for such securities"). 
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transfer has been a further concern of parties to securitization 
transactions.' 40 Courts decide whether a particular transfer is a 
collateral transfer or a true sale based upon the presence or 
absence of a number of factors." 41 These factors include: (i) residual 
interests retained by the transferor, (ii) transfer price set at fair 
market value by independent appraisers, (iii) recourse to the asset 
transferor, (iv) the acquisition of dominion and control over the 
assets by the transferee, (v) the transfer of the benefits and 
burdens of ownership by the transferee, and (vi) the intent of the 
parties as expressed in their writings.'2 Many securitization 
transactions, however, include a mix of factors, some suggesting a 
40. See Bjork, supra note 39, at 122 (noting that "[tlhe potential problems 
associated with securitization in the bankruptcy context are properly attributable 
to inconsistent judicial evaluation of these transactions"). 
41. See generally Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhof, Characterization 
of a Transfer of Receivables as a Sale or Secured Loan Upon the Bankruptcy of 
the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 186-206 (1991) (noting that bankruptcy 
courts look at the context of the asset transfer, taking into consideration a variety 
of factors). 
42. See, e.g., In re Comet Capital Corp., 142 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(explaining that a transfer was a loan due to transferee's payment of interest to 
purchasers of interests, notwithstanding transferor's default); In re Evergreen 
Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Maine 1982) (explaining that a 
transfer was a security interest due to debtor's retained interest); In re Hurricane 
Elkhorn Coal Corp., 19 B.R. 609 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (explaining that a 
transfer was a security interest because of debtor's retained interest); Federated 
Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 500, 511 (1968), affd, 426 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 
1970) (explaining that because transferor retained some risk, transfer was 
deemed to be a loan); see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re 
Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 272 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a transferor 
retention of risk, coupled with lending interest rate, suggested a loan rather than 
a sale); Bear v. Coben (In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc.), 829 F.2d 705, 707, 710 
(9th Cir. 1986). See generally Aicher & Fellerhof, supra note 41, at 182-84; Peter 
L. Mancini, Bankruptcy and the UC.C. as Applied to Securitization: 
Characterizing a Mortgage Loan Transfer as a Sale or Secured Loan, 73 B.U. L. 
REv. 873, 877-82 (1992) (noting that the U.C.C. provides no rules for resolving 
the sale/loan issue); Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of 
Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 287, 290 (1991) (relating the absence of 
universal criteria for the determination of the sale versus loan issue); see also 
Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 542-44 (3d Cir. 
1979) (describing the factors relevant to the determination of the existence of a 
true sale). 
2002] REVISED ARTICLE 9
 
true sale and others suggesting a collateral transfer. While parties 
may intend one characterization, the facts and circumstances of the 
transfer may suggest another.' 43 Because definitively concluding a 
particular asset transfer is a true sale is so difficult, lawyers have 
historically been reluctant, and in some instances unwilling, to offer 
4unqualified legal opinions to that effect. ' 
Even if the parties' characterization of both the assets 
43. See, e.g., Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc. (In re 
S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279, 283 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (determining, 
notwithstanding the parties' characterization as a sale, that a participation 
agreement was determined to be a loan transaction); Boerner v. Colwell Co., 577 
P.2d 200, 204-05 (Cal. 1978) (deeming a transfer of construction contracts to be a 
sale and not a loan). 
44. See, e.g., George Bermant, The Role of the Opinion of Counsel: A 
Tentative Reevaluation, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 132 (1974); Scott Fitzgibbon & Donald 
W. Glazer, Legal Opinions in Corporate Transaction: The Opinion on 
Agreements andInstruments, 12 J. CORP. COUNS. 657 (1987); Robert J. Harter, Jr. 
& Kenneth N. Klee, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy Codeon the "Bankruptcy 
Out" in Legal Opinions, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 277 (1979); Special Committee on 
Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, New York City County Lawyer's 
Ass'n in Cooperation with The Corporation Law Committee of the Ass'n of the 
Bar of the City of New York & The Corporation Law Committee of the Banking, 
Corporation and Business Section, New York State Bar Ass'n, Legal Opinions to 
Third Parties:An Easier Path, 34 Bus. LAW. 1891 (1979); see also United States 
Senate Committee on the JudiciarySubcommittee on Administrative Oversightand 
The Courts: HearingsRegarding the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 106th Cong., Mar. 
18, 1999 (statement of Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & 
Hamilton), availableat 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-gros.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002) 
[hereinafter Grosshandler Statement]. 
In order to obtain sales treatment under the relevant accounting standards, 
participants in mortgage-backed and asset-backed securitization transactions 
must obtain assurances from counsel that the sale of assets will be final under 
applicable bankruptcy law. Such legal advice is referred to as a "true sale 
opinion." Unfortunately, there is a lack of guiding judicial precedent regarding 
what constitutes such a true sale of assets. The considerations in the analysis 
are highly subjective and depend upon a qualitative assessment of a wide 
variety of facts and circumstances. For these and other reasons, any true sale 
opinion will generally be a reasoned one, with various assumptions as to factual 
matters and conclusions that introduce an unnecessary degree of legal 
uncertainty in the asset-backed market. As a result, for some types of 
transactions, true sale opinions can be extremely difficult, costly, and in a few 
cases, impossible to render. 
Id. at 10. 
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transferred and the nature of the transfer is deemed by a court to 
be correct, the transferor's bankruptcy may still pose a threat to 
the interests of the transferee. While it is commonly understood 
that the sale of an asset, if perfected, removes it from the 
transferor's bankruptcy estate, this understanding is not universal.'5 
In the now notorious ' case of Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer,47 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 
property sold by the debtor prior to its bankruptcy was part of 
debtor's bankruptcy estate.4 The Tenth Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of "estate" in United 
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,9 in concluding that because property 
of the estate includes property subject to a security interest, and 
because the sales of accounts are governed by the law governing 
45. Recently, the bankruptcy court in In re LTV Steel., Inc., held that Debtor 
retained "at least some equitable interest" in its securitized receivables,
"sufficient to support the entry of the interim cash collateral order." In re LTV 
Steel, Inc., No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 
2001). 
46. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Octagon Gas Ruling Creates Turmoil for 
Commercial and Asset-Based Finance, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1993, at 1 (sharply 
criticizing the Octagon decision). 
47. Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995 
F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993). In Octagon, the transferee did not file a financing 
statement to perfect its interest, leaving it vulnerable to avoidance by the 
bankruptcy trustee, pursuant to its § 544(a) lien avoidance powers. Id. It is 
possible, however, that the transferee was automatically perfected under § 9­
302(1)(e), providing for the automatic perfection of certain isolated and small 
transfers of accounts. Id. at 958. 
48 Octagon did not present the issue of what is included in a transferor's 
bankruptcy estate in the context of a prototypical securitization. Instead, the 
transferor was transferring interests in the proceeds of certain sales of natural 
gas. Id. at 951, 954. The Court initially observed that the transferred interest was 
an account, as defined by Section 9-106, and sales of accounts are governed by 
Article 9. Id. The Court continued by observing that, notwithstanding the fact 
that the "transactions giving rise to the account were not intended to secure a 
debt," asset sales are covered by Article 9, "whether intended for security or 
not." Id. at 955. The underlying asset, natural gas, once extracted and sold, is a 
"good," and the payment stream arising from the sale of that good is an 
"account." Id. Article 9 defines an "account" as "any right to payment for goods 
sold.., which is not evidenced by an instrument of chattel paper." OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12A § 9-106 (West Supp. 1993). 
49. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203-05 (1983). 
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transfers of security interests, accounts sold remain property of the 
debtor's bankruptcy estate.-" 50
Indeed, the Octagon decision, coupled with the uncertainty 
surrounding both the issue of asset classification and the scope of 
Article 9, led the PEB Drafting Committee to make a series of 
substantive changes to Article 9, designed to minimize the risk to 
originators and investors engaging in securitization transactions." 
III. REVISED ARTICLE 9'S CHANGES IMPACTING SECURITIZING
 
ORIGINATORS AND THEIR CREDITORS
 
A. Issues of Asset ClassificationandArticle 9's Governanceof Sale 
Revised Article 9 makes it easier to securitize a greater 
number of types of assets.52 Revised Section 9-102(a)(2) has 
redefined "account" to include "right[s] to payment of a monetary 
obligation.., for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, 
licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of." 3 Many categories of 
"rights to payment," that were formerly classified as general 
intangibles or instruments under old Article 9,' now fall within 
Revised Article 9's definition of "accounts."" Now, intellectual 
property licensing receivables as well as credit card receivables are 
explicitly classified as accounts and may be sold - and thus 
securitized - under Article 9. This change in the definition of 
"account" addresses the securitization market's concerns about 
ambiguity both in asset classification and in the applicable law 
governing transfer. 
Moreover, Article 9's sales coverage is further expanded to 
50. Octagon, 995 F.2d at 957. 
51. PEB STUDY, supranote 6,at 181-84. 
52. See supranote 7 and accompanying text. 
53. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001). 
54. See U.C.C. §9-106 (1972) (amended 1999). 
55. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2000). Now, intellectual licensing receivables as 
well as credit card receivables are explicitly classified as accounts and may be sold 
- and thus securitized - under Article 9. See id.; see also THOMAS M. WARD, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 2:11 (2000). 
51
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include "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes."56 
"Payment intangibles," a new category of collateral, are defined as 
"general intangible[s] under which the account debtor's principal 
obligation is a monetary obligation."" Receivables that are not 
"chattel paper," "instruments" or "accounts"58 (because they are 
not "property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, 
assigned or otherwise disposed of") are "general intangibles" for 
the payment of money - meaning, "payment intangibles."59 The 
56. Revised § 9-109(a)(3) states that "this article applies to .. .a sale of 
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes." U.C.C. § 9­
109(a)(3) (2001). The definition of "promissory note" is similarly new, and 
according to the Official Comment, was "necessitated by the inclusion of sales of 
promissory notes within the scope of Article 9." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(65). The 
definition reads: 
'Promissory note' means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a 
monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain 
an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of 
money or funds. 
Id. 
57. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61). Comment 5d notes that "payment intangibles" 
are a subset of "general intangibles." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) cmt. 5d. "Virtually 
any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment of money once one 
hypothesizes, for example, that the account debtor is in breach of its obligation." 
Id. The term "payment intangible," however, embraces only those general 
intangibles "under which the account debtor's principalobligation is a monetary 
obligation." Id. (emphasis in original). General intangibles are a "residual 
category of personal property" under Revised Article 9. Comment 5d to Revised 
§ 9-102(42) states that "any personal property, including things in action, other 
than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, 
documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, 
letters of credit, money, and oil, gas or other minerals before extraction" are 
general intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42). Examples cited in the Official 
Comment include intellectual property and the right to payment of a loan of 
funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument. U.C.C. § 9­
102(a)(42) cmt. 5d. 
58. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2). 
59. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) ("'General intangible' means any personal 
property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, 
commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, 
investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, 
or other minerals before extraction."). "'Payment intangible' means a general 
intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary 
obligation." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61). 
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definition of "payment intangibles" includes payment streams from 
the sale of portions of loan pools, known as loan participations.' 
B. Removal of Restrictionson the Transfer of CertainAssets 
UCC Section 9-406(d) & (f), building upon old Section 9­
318(4)," 61 renders ineffective both contractual anti-assignment 
provisions and any "rule of law, statute, or regulation" that 
restricts assignment of payment rights.6' These provisions make 
explicit that they (i) apply to assignments and transfers as well as 
security interests, (ii) render ineffective terms that merely restrict, 
rather than prohibit assignment, and (iii) render ineffective terms 
that trigger a default, termination or other penalty based on 
assignment.' 63 Moreover, revised Section 9-408 makes many 
60. Transfers of interests of loan participations are perfected automatically. 
U.C.C. § 9-309(3) ("The following security interests are perfected when they 
attach:... (3) a sale of a payment intangible."). The danger with such automatic 
perfection of a transfer of payment intangibles and promissory notes is that 
searchers of the public records will not discover another party's prior interest in 
these assets. 
61. 	 Former U.C.C. § 9-318(4) reads: 
A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective 
if it prohibits assignment of an account or prohibits creation of a security 
interest in a general intangible for money due or to become due or requires the 
account debtor's consent to such assignment or security interest. 
U.C.C. § 9-318 (1995). 
62. U.C.C. §§ 9-406(d) & (f) (2001). 
63. 	 See id. Specifically, new U.C.C. § 9-406(d) reads: 
d) [Term restricting assignment generally ineffective.] Except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (e) and Sections 2A-303 and 9-407, and subject to 
subsection (h), a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an 
assignor or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it: 
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person 
obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, 
attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account, 
chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or 
(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, 
perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, 
breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, 
or remedy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory 
note. 
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otherwise non-assignable rights lienable, provided that the rights of 
5the account debtor ' are not adversely affected.6 These Article 9 
revisions are designed to aid the securitization of assets by 
removing or reducing restrictions on such assets' transfer while 
protecting account debtors' interests." 
C. DebtorsRetain No Interest in Sold Assets 
The issue that was clouded by the Octagon decision67 ­
whether a debtor retains an interest in sold assets - is squarely 
8addressed in UCC's Revised Section 9-318(a). 6 This section states 
that "[a] debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment 
intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable 
interest in the collateral sold. 
69 
Revised Section 9-318(b) further makes explicit that "a debtor 
U.C.C. §9-406(d). 
64. Comment 5 to Revised § 9-408 further makes clear that the term 
"account debtor," defined in Revised §9-102 (3), refers to: 
the party, other than the debtor, to a general intangible, including a permit, 
license, franchise, or the like, and the person obligated on a health-care­
insurance receivable, which is a type of account. The definition of 'account 
debtor' does not limit the term to persons who are obligated to pay under a 
general intangible. Rather, the term includes all persons who are obligated on a 
general intangible, including those who are obligated to render performance in 
exchange for payment. 
U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 5 (emphasis in original). The licensor of intellectual property 
is obligated to perform on "general intangibles" and is therefore an "account 
debtor." See WARD, supranote 55, at § 2:13. 
65. U.C.C. §§ 9-408(a) & (c). Consent of the account debtor, however, is 
required to enforce such security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-408(d). 
66. Thus, "'[a]ccount debtor' means a person obligated on an account, chattel 
paper, or general intangible. The term does not include persons obligated to pay 
a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper." 
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3). 
67. See supra,notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
68. U.C.C. § 9-318(a). 
69. 	 See id. Comment 2 observes that this provision: 
makes explicit what was implicit, but perfectly obvious, under former Article 9: 
The fact that an account or chattel paper gives rise to a "security interest" does 
not imply that the seller retains an interest in the property that has been sold. 
To the contrary, a seller of an account or chattel paper retains no interest 
whatsoever in the property to the extent it has been sold. 
U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 2. 
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that has sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer's security 
interest is unperfected,... [has] rights and title to the account or 
chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold."7 Comment 3 to 
the section observes: "if the buyer's security interest is unperfected, 
the seller can transfer, and the creditors of the seller can reach, the 
account or chattel paper as if it had not been sold."'" Accordingly, 
upon the transferor's bankruptcy, the trustee can recover the 
unperfected transfer under Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a), and 
such transferred assets are included in the bankruptcy estate.72 
Section 9-318, however, does not address the equitable 
determination of whether a particular asset transfer is properly 
characterized as a sale of assets or a transfer of collateral in 
connection with a loan (the collateral transfer versus true sale 
dilemma).73 Comment 2 makes this clear in noting that, "[n]either 
this Article nor the definition of 'security interest' in Section 1-201 
provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that 
create a security interest securing an obligation."7 ' Thus, this 
remains a determination to be made by courts on a case-by-case 
basis. 
D. Express Validationof After-Acquired Receivables to Be 
Securitized 
Revised Sections 9-204(a) & (c) expressly validates "after­
acquired property" and "future advance" clauses when the 
transaction involves the sale of "accounts," "chattel paper,"
"payment intangibles" and "promissory notes."75 The comment to 
70. Id. §9-318(b). 
71. Id. § 9-318 cmt. 3. 
72 Id. §§ 541(a)(3), 544 (Section 544(a) provides that "[tihe trustee ... may 
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor.., that is voidable by ... a bona fide 
purchaser. .. against whom applicable law permits such a transfer to be perfected 
73. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (describing the proposed 
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code designed to federalize the true sale versus 
collateral transfer determination, based upon the parties to the transaction's 
characterization of the transfer). 
74. U.C.C § 9-318 cmt. 2. 
75. Revised Section 9-204 (a) & (c) read: 
(a) a security agreement may create or provide for a security interest in after­
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the section observes that these provisions make explicit what was 
implicit under old Article 9.76 While not changing the law, this 
revision will increase ABS investors' confidence that their initially 
perfected interests in asset-backed securities, backed by after-
acquired payment streams, will remain perfected.' 
E. ExoandedConceptof "Proceeds" 
The definition of collateral "proceeds" has been modified 
under Revised Article 9.7" Revised Section 9-102(a)(64) defines
"proceeds" as "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, 
exchange, or other disposition of collateral," and "rights arising out 
of collateral."" This definition, in eliminating the requirement that 
to constitute proceeds, the original collateral must be "disposed" 
of, expands the type of collateral that may be claimed by a 
perfected transferee of securitized assets. The impact of this 
expanded definition is most fully realized upon the securitization of 
originator's bankruptcy.' 
acquired collateral ... 
(c) [a] security agreement may provide that collateral secures, or that accounts, 
chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes are sold in connection 
with, future advances or other value, whether or not the advances or value or 
given pursuant to commitment. 
Id. at §§ 9-204(a) & (c). 
76. Id. §§ 9-204(a) & (c) cmt. 6. But see Carlson, supra note 9, at 1111-12 
("Article 9 does not expressly authorize after acquired property clauses when 
accounts are sold. Rather, it authorizes after-acquired property clauses only 
when a lender advances a loan and takes after-acquired accounts as collateral."). 
77. PEB Study, supranote 6, at 185. 
78. Old Article 9 defines "proceeds" as what is "received upon the sale, 
exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." U.C.C. § 9­
306(1) (1995). 
79. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2001). "Proceeds" now specifically includes "cash 
or stock dividends distributed on account of securities or other investment 
property that is original collateral," rejecting the holding of Hastie. See Hastie v. 
FDIC,2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993). U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 13a. 
80. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the 
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 309 (discussing the significance of the 
expanded definition of "proceeds" of collateral in terms of the securitization 
originator's bankruptcy). 
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Bankruptcy law makes a clear distinction between proceedsof 
collateral and property that arises after the initial secured 
transaction that does not fall within the definition of "proceeds," 
namely "after-acquired collateral."'" Assets that are acquired by a 
bankruptcy debtor following the filing of a petition are either 
deemed to be "proceeds" or "after acquired property."82 Section 
552 of the Bankruptcy Code cuts off secured parties' interests in 
"after acquired collateral," unless the post-petition collateral is 
proceeds of the original collateral. Section 552, in limiting its 
recognition of post-petition security interests, furthers the 
bankruptcy policy of preserving the value of the bankruptcy estate 
for the benefit of the bankruptcy debtor's unsecured creditors.' 
81. See id. at 306, 309 (detailing how Article 9 distinguishes between 
"proceeds" of collateral and "after-acquired collateral"). After-acquired 
collateral is "[t]hat property that arises after the initial secured transaction that 
does not fall within the definition of 'proceeds'." Id. at 309 (emphasis in original). 
82. 11 U.S.C. §552 (2000). 
83. Section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that "[e]xcept as provided 
in subsection (b), property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the 
commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security 
agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case." 11 
U.S.C. §552(a). Section 552(b) states: 
(b)(1) if the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the 
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security 
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the 
commencement of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring, or profits of 
such property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds, product, 
offspring, or profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case 
to the extent provided in such security agreement and by applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a 
hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise. 
11 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
84. "The scope of... [§ 541(a)(1)] is broad. It includes all kinds of property, 
including tangible or intangible property causes of action ... and all other forms 
of property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act." H.R. Rep. 
No. 95-595, p. 367 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 82 (1978). Numerous 
bankruptcy precedents confirm the debtor's need for post-petition cash flow in 
order to reorganize and pay unsecured creditors. See In re Dynaco Corp., 162 
B.R. 389, 393 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) ("Debtors seeking to reorganize under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code frequently need to use their cash and 
proceeds therefrom in order to continue with their business operations."); see 
also In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (recognizing the 
necessity of debtor's using cash collateral rents in the first months following a 
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Because the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define
"proceeds," the Article 9 definition of "proceeds" becomes key to 
the determination of what estate property remains 
unencumbered.'5 Because ABS purchasers can reach proceeds, but 
not after acquired property, the expanded definition of "proceeds" 
in Revised Article 9 will result in less unencumbered "after­
acquired property" and a greater number and type of assets 
deemed to be the "proceeds" of asset-backed security-holder's 
interests." 
bankruptcy in order to conduct its business during the reorganization effort); In 
re Earth Lite, Inc., 9 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) ("[I]t is evident that if 
a Debtor who seeks relief under Chapter 11 is deprived of the use of cash, its 
chances to secure rehabilitation are immediately destroyed and very few, if any, 
entities could survive and effectuate a reorganization without cash."); In re 
Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 B.R. 720, 721 (W.D. Mo. 1982) ("The evidence 
shows that debtor could not reorganize without the use of cash collateral."); see 
also United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Administrative Oversight and The Courts: Hearings Regarding the Business 
Bankruptcy Act, 106th Cong. (Mar. 17, 1999) (testimony of Professor Kenneth N. 
Klee, on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference), available at 
http://www.house.gov/judciary/106-klee.htm (last visited on Feb. 20, 2002) 
[hereinafter Klee Testimony]. 
85. Courts have not been consistent in their interpretation of what is meant 
by "proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" in Section 552(b). See In re Hastie, 2 
F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) The exception "except to any extent that the court... 
based on the equities of other case, orders otherwise" has only added to the 
inconsistency of court opinions with respect to this issue. See id. (relying upon 
state law definition of proceeds in holding that a security interest in stock 
dividends was not perfected because it was not a substitute for disposed of stock 
(the collateral), pursuant to section 9-306(4)); In re Bumper Sales, 907 F.2d 1430, 
1437 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that Article 9's definition of "proceeds" was the 
definition to be applied in determining the scope of Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)); 
J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 779 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that a party with a security interest in receivables and accounts had a 
perfected interest, as proceeds, in a payment received post-petition pursuant to a 
pre-petition account). Revised Article 9 brings licensing income within the 
definition of "proceeds" whether or not any portion of the underlying intellectual 
property was "disposed of" under the license. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2001); 
WARD, supranote 55, §§ 2:29, 2:86-91. 
86. See WARD, supra note 55, at § 2 (explaining that Revised Article 9's 
expansion of the definition of proceeds has resulted in a substantial benefit to 
leveraged secured creditors). 
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AFFECTING 
SECURITIZATION 
Among the many proposed changes in the pending bankruptcy 
reform legislation is a redefinition of the term "estate."" The 
proposed amendment to Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code 
excludes from the debtor's "estate" assets transferred in a 
securitization transaction." 
87. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code reads in part: 
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title 
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, 
wherever located and by whomever held: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. 
11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). 
88. Section 912 of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection 	Act of 2001 (Introduced in the House on Jan. 30, 2001) reads: 
SEC. 912. ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATIONS. 
Section 541 of title 11, United States Code, is amended 
(i) in subsection (b) by inserting after paragraph (7), as added by this Act, the 
following: 
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset 
was transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to 
an eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed securitization, except to 
the extent such assets (or proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the 
trustee under section 550 by virtue of avoidance under section 548(a); and 
(ii) 	by adding at the end the following new subsection 
(f) For purposes of this section ­
(1) The term 'asset-backed securitization' means a transaction in which eligible 
assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of payment on 
securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by governmental 
units, at least one class or tranche of which was rated investment grade by one 
or more nationally recognized securities rating organizations, when the 
securities were initially issued by an issuer; 
(2) The term 'eligible asset' means­
(A) financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds thereof), either 
fixed or revolving, whether or not the same are in existence as of the date of the 
transfer, including residential and commercial mortgage loans, consumer 
receivables, trade receivables, assets of governmental units, including payment 
obligations relating to taxes, receipts, fines, tickets, and other sources of 
revenue, and lease receivables, that, by their terms, convert into cash within a 
finite period, plus any residual interest in property subject to receivables 
included in such financing assets plus any rights or other assets designed to 
assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to security holders; 
(B) cash; and 
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The redefinition of "estate" will remove from the jurisdiction 
of the bankruptcy court, "eligible assets" "transferred" by the 
debtor to an "eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed 
securitization." 89  "Eligible assets" are defined to include 
commonly securitized receivables.' Receivables, including credit 
(C) securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by 
governmental units; 
The term 'eligible entity' means­
(A) an issuer; or 
(B) a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit. Limited liability 
company (including a single member limited liability company), or other entity 
engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and transferring eligible assets 
directly or indirectly to an issuer and taking actions ancillary thereto; 
The term 'issuer' means a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit, 
limited liability company (including a single member limited liability company), 
or other entity engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and holding 
eligible assets, issuing securities backed by eligible assets, and taking actions 
ancillary thereto; and 
The term 'transferred' means, the debtor, under a written agreement, 
represented and warranted that eligible assets were sold, contributed, or 
otherwise conveyed with the intention of removing them from the estate of the 
debtor pursuant to subsection (b)(8) (whether or not reference is made to this 
title or any section hereof), irrespective and without limitation of ­
(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an interest in the 
issuer or in any securities issued by the issuer; 
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to service or 
supervise the servicing of all or any portion of such eligible assets; or 
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other conveyance for tax, 
accounting, regulatory reporting or other purposes. 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 
107th Cong. § 912. 
89. Id.; cf.11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). Before and currently, no such asset would 
escape a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction unless it was definitively sold away to the 
debtor prior to bankruptcy. See Carlson, supra note 9, at 1056 (arguing against 
the very result that Revised Section 912 would institutionalize). 
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Furthermore, the definition of "asset securitization" 
in the amendment does not exclude all securitized assets form the originator's 
bankruptcy estate - simply those assets that are transferred and result in the 
issuance of securities rated investment grade or better by a nationally-recognized 
statistical rating organization. This limits the "carve out" from the definition of 
"estate" to public offering and rated private issuances. Unrated assets securitized 
in private issuances remain uncovered by this exception, however. See also 
Testimony of Ann Stern, CEO, Financial Guarantee Insurance Corporation, 
FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TESTIMONY, May 19, 1998 
[hereinafter Stem Testimony] (claiming that the application of the proposed 
REVISED ARTICLE 920021 
card receivables, intellectual property licenses, cash and securities 
are all deemed to be "eligible" for purposes of this provision." 
V. NORMATIVE ISSUES RAISED BY CHANGES TO ARTICLE 9 AND
 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE - THE SYSTEM
 
HAS BEEN SHOCKED!
 
The debate among legal scholars concerning whether secured 
creditors ought to have full priority in bankruptcy continued 
throughout Article 9's revision process.' Some academics posited 
that it is economically efficient and socially desirable for secured 
claims in bankruptcy to have full priority of repayment.93 Other 
scholars, citing efficiency and fairness concerns, challenged the 
absolute supremacy of secured claims, to the exclusion of 
unsecured claims and questioned whether secured financing's 
continued dominance misallocates resources by forcing unsecured 
creditors into the role of recipient of limited residual interests, 
without their affirmative consent. ' The issues raised in this debate 
have spilled over and have application to the question of whether 
amendment is limited to "investment grade securities substantially reduc[ing] the 
possibility that a lender or an operating company could transfer some or all of its 
loan assets or other receivables to a bankruptcy remote entity in an effort to 
defraud creditors of the company."). 
91. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, 
H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001); WARD, supra note 55, §2:11. 
92 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. For a brief synopsis of the 
debate, see ABI Releases Law Review on Revised Article 9, BCD NEWS & 
COMMENT, Aug. 1, 2001. 
93. See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured 
Transactions:Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 KAN. L. REv. 13 
(1993); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and 
PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Hideki Kanda & Saul 
Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities,80 VA. L. REv. 2103 (1994); Homer 
Kripke, Law and Economics:Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial 
Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929 (1985); Alan Schwarz, The 
ContinuingPuzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984); Robert E. 
Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,86 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1986); 
Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions,41 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 1067, 1118 (1989); James J. White, Efficiency Justificationsfor Personal 
PropertySecurity, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1984). 
94. See sources cited supranote 8. 
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there are any harmful consequences to the unsecured creditors of 
securitizing debtors in bankruptcy and whether securitized asset 
transferees ought to be able to opt out, by contract, of participation 
in the bankruptcy process." 
The most immediate and obvious effect of the Revised Article 
9 provisions that streamline, facilitate and generally make 
securitization easier to effectuate will be a further expansion of the 
securitization market.96 The revised definition of "account" ' and 
the extension of Article 9's sales coverage,98 coupled with the 
relaxation of restrictions on asset transfers," will make it easier to 
securitize more types of assets with greater certainty."M Moreover, 
if bankruptcy courts adopt Revised Article 9's definition of 
proceeds, more post-petition assets will be deemed to be 
securitized proceeds, rather than after-acquired unencumbered 
estate property. Accordingly, a consequence of this expansion will 
be that fewer assets available for residual claimants upon a 
securitizing originator's liquidation. 
A less obvious, although not necessarily less immediate, effect 
of Article 9 changes will be that securitizing businesses, having 
transferred their cash flow will have less ability to, and thus will be 
less likely to, reorganize. ' Since a debtor's bankruptcy estate does 
not generally include property transferred, the more after-acquired 
proceeds are deemed to have been securitized, the more assets that 
are outside of the reach of the automatic stay and the trustee's 
turnover powers. As such, a securitizing debtor-in-bankruptcy's 
cash flow from its securitized receivables will be unavailable to the 
95. See supranote 9 and accompanying text. 
96. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the 
Bankruptcy Dynamic,supranote 9, at 293 (pointing out that "the volume of ABS 
issuances has grown from $1 billion in 1985 to $185 billion in 1999"). 
97. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001).
 
9& Id. § 9-102(a)(2) cmt. 5a.
 
99. Id. §§ 9-406(d) & (f). 
100. See, e.g., Edward E. Gainor, Pending Legislation Would Change True 
Sale Analysis, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Mar. 12, 2001 (stating that "[the] 
proposed legislative provisions should have the effect of simplifying some 
securitization structures and facilitating transactions that are difficult or 
impossible to execute under the constraints imposed by traditional true sale 
analysis;" see alsosupranotes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
101. See supranotes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
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debtor for use in connection with its reorganization efforts. '1 This 
cash flow may be necessary to pay employees, trade creditors, 
consumer claims, and to generally keep the debtor afloat during 
the pending reorganization. 3 
The Article 9 revisions will have an even greater effect on 
bankruptcy outcomes when read in conjunction with proposed 
changes in the Bankruptcy Code designed to further benefit parties 
to securitization transactions." The bankruptcy reform legislation 
102. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the 
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 294-97, 301-02 (noting, however, that the 
opposite result is also possible, as evidenced by the Octagon Gas Systems v. 
Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948, 957 decision). In the recent case of In re LTV Steel, Inc., 
the Bankruptcy Court examined the issue of whether a reorganizing debtor 
retained any interest in its securitized receivables. See generally In re LTV Steel, 
Inc., No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2001). In 
that case the Court observed that if debtor was unable to access its liquid 
receivables, it would have immediately ceased business operations. LTV Steel, 
Inc., 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 at *5. With respect to the issue of whether the 
securitized assets were property of the estate, the court said: 
[Tihere seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest that the Debtor does not 
retain at least an equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim 
order. Debtor's business requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast various 
metal products. To suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in 
products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds to be derived 
from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly, the court concludes that 
Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the inventory and receivables, 
and that this interest is property of the Debtor's estate. This equitable interest 
is sufficient to support the entry of the interim cash collateral order. Finally, it 
is readily apparent that granting Abbey National relief from the interim cash 
collateral order would be highly inequitable. The Court is satisfied that the 
entry of the interim order was necessary to enable Debtor to keep its doors 
open and continue to meet its obligations to its employees, retirees, customers 
and creditors. Allowing Abbey National to modify the order would allow 
Abbey National to enforce its state law rights as a secured lender to look to the 
collateral in satisfaction of this debt. This circumstance would put an end to 
Debtor's business, would put thousands of people out of work, would deprive 
100,000 retirees of needed medical benefits, and would have more far reaching 
economic effects on the geographic areas where Debtor does business .... 
Id. at 131. 
103. Id. In addition, refer to cases listed supra note 84, evidencing the courts' 
recognition that the debtor must have access to a healthy cash flow in order to 
successfully meet the goals of bankruptcy. See also Klee Testimony, supra note 
84. 
104. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text; see also Klee Testimony, 
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includes a redefinition of the term "estate,""0 ° carving out of it 
certain assets that have been transferred in connection with a 
securitization. Notwithstanding the fact that it was referred to in 
the Congressional Record as a "clarification,"'" and Congressional 
testimony as "in the nature of [a] technical correction,"" this 
provision, if enacted, will fundamentally alter the essence of 
supra note 85 (explaining how the new changes will be a detriment both to 
debtors' estates and to unsecured creditors). 
105. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the 
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, n.173 (noting that a debtor's bankruptcy 
estate was originally defined under § 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Act as comprising 
of "interests of the debtor in property."); see also 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (2000) 
(stating that a trustee has the power to "collect and reduce to money the property 
of the estate"); Id. § 726 (outlining the scheme for the distribution of property of 
the estate); Id. § 1129 (describing how property of the estate used in connection 
with plan of reorganization); Id. §§ 363(b)(1), (c)(1) (noting that the property of 
the estate must be used, sold or leased); Id. §§ 364(c)(2), (c)(3), (d)(1) (debtor's 
borrowing secured by property of the estate); Id. §542(a) (authorizing the trustee 
to demand return of "property that the trustee may use, sell or lease under 
section 363); Id. §§ 362(a)(2) - (4); Id. §364(d). Of course, a secured party whose 
collateral is being used by a reorganizing debtor must be offered "adequate 
protection" of its interest. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions 
and the Bankruptcy Dynamic,supra note 9, at 298-99 (pointing out that adequate 
protection is usually the only consideration given to such a secured party). In 
addition, the Code's automatic stay precludes actions taken with respect to 
property of the estate. In Chapter 11 cases, property of the estate necessary to 
the reorganization may be used by the debtor, notwithstanding a secured parties' 
state law created interest. The corollary to this rule, designed to encourage the 
reorganization of viable businesses, is that debtor may not use non-estate 
property to reorganize. 
106. Congressional Record, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2001, 107th Cong., Jan. 31, 2001, availableat 
http://www.abiworld.org/hr333.html (last visited on Feb. 27, 2002) [hereinafter 
Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation] (noting that 
"the purpose of the special order to which I am attached today is to announce the 
introduction of the new bankruptcy reform act that we hope will be enacted into 
law during this current session and swiftly to arrive at the President's desk for 
signature.... It also clarifies the treatment of certain financial contracts under 
the banking laws as well as under the Bankruptcy Code"). 
107. Grosshandler Statement, supranote 44 ("These proposed changes should 
not raise sweeping new policy issues - they are entirely consistent with many 
statutory provision that have already been enacted, and are in the nature of 
technical corrections."). 
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business bankruptcy." 
Property that constitutes a debtor's bankruptcy estate is at the 
center of the bankruptcy process." Estate property is used to 
satisfy creditor claims, it may be used, sold, leased, or borrowed 
against, and it may be required to be returned to the estate if the 
property is currently in the hands of third parties. ' As noted 
above, the Bankruptcy Code has historically relied upon non-
bankruptcy law to define the rights of parties to the bankruptcy 
under the Code."' Ascertaining whether a transfer of Article 9 
assets are properly included in the transferee's bankruptcy estate, 
the nature of the transfer, as well as the steps needed to establish 
the transferee's property rights have always been non-bankruptcy­
law determinations. 
Current law tries to balance the rights of transferees of 
securitized assets against the interests of the debtor's general 
creditors,... who may not be aware, unless they check the public 
filing records, that the debtor no longer owns what appears to be 
its income stream. At present, in order for an asset transferee to 
108. This section would allow many transactions to be structured so that in the 
event of bankruptcy, no cash collateral would be available for funding a 
reorganization or repaying unsecured creditors. This is because of the overly broad 
definition which treats many secured loans as asset transfer, which in turn would 
remove those assets from property of the bankrupt's estate. Removal of such assets 
will virtually ensure a shortage of cash, and thereby create a crisis for many troubled 
businesses whose receivables represent the only source of liquidity. Because this 
provision represents a departure from the federal policy of favoring reorganizations 
over the liquidation of viable business enterprises, the League opposes this provision. 
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative 
Oversight and The Courts: Hearings Regarding the Business Bankruptcy Act, 
106th Congress (Mar. 19, 1999) (Statement of the Commercial Law League of 
America and its Bankruptcy and Insolvency Section), availableat 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-gree.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002). 
109. The debtor's estate, as defined under section 541(a), is comprised of 
"interests of the debtor in property." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1997). 
110. Id. § 704(1) (stating that trustee has the power to "collect and reduce to 
money the property of the estate"). 
111. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
112. Worcester County Nat'l Bank v. Xinde Int'l, Inc., 13 B.R. 212, 215 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) ("The court in a reorganization case must balance the 
needs of the creditor's protection against the debtor's likelihood of a successful 
rehabilitation."). 
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effectively acquire the debtor's equity in these assets, and thus 
remove them from the reach of general creditors, the transfer of 
accounts must be deemed a "true sale." Whether or not the 
transfer is a true sale, if the asset is governed by Article 9, the 
transferee must give notice of the transfer by filing a financing 
statement."3 As stated earlier, because a bulk "true sale" of a 
debtor's accounts can be structured in a way that takes on certain 
aspects of a secured loan to the debtor,"' state law allows the 
debtor's creditors to pierce the formal structure of a documented 
"sale" of accounts and treat the buyer's interest as a lien rather 
than an ownership right."5 
Section 912 of the bankruptcy reform legislation upsets the 
current balance and unduly favors the institutional investors at the 
expense of ordinary general creditors of the debtor, and the debtor 
itself, who will not be able to reorganize in bankruptcy without any 
access to cash flow."6 Two parts of Section 912 are particularly 
one-sided attempts to give federal protection to participants in the 
structured finance market. 
First, the proposed amendment both "federalizes" and 
"formalizes" the issue of whether the underlying transfer of these 
account assets is a sale (as distinguished from a collateral transfer 
made in connection with a loan). Under the proposed language of 
Section 912, whenever the parties represent in writing that a sale 
was intended, that formal characterization controls, 
notwithstanding the way the transfer would be characterized under 
state law."7 The decided cases contain instances where transfers 
framed as "sales" by parties are determined to be the functional 
113. See generally Charles Cheatham, Changes in Filing Procedures Under 
Revised Article 9, 25 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 235 (2000) (detailing the numerous 
filing requirements of parties to a secured transaction governed by Article 9, with 
the Article's 1999 revision in mind). 
114. See Plank, supra note 42, at 290; see also supra notes 40-44 and 
accompanying text. 
115. See id. at 315-16. 
116. See generally Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 9, at 226-31 (lamenting 
the "privatization" of the bankruptcy system, and arguing that thanks to Section 
912, larger institutional investors will be able to "circumvent the bankruptcy 
process" through securitization). 
117. For the text of the proposed Section 912, see supra note 88. 
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equivalent of a collateralized loan."' For example, when the 
debtor retains some risk of ownership or when the buyer retains 
recourse rights against the debtor, courts, citing consideration of 
fairness, have overridden the parties' formal expression of intent 
and properly characterized the transaction as a collateralized 
loan."9 
Notwithstanding some of the testimony in hearings in support 
of proposed Section 912,"z there is not "a lack of guiding judicial 
'precedent regarding what constitutes such a true sale of assets.' . 
Courts analyzing the circumstances of the transfer and the interests 
of all parties affected by the transaction regularly make this 
characterization.1 
Second, even if Congress decides that the special needs of the 
bond market override the balance struck among creditor interests 
under state law, the language of Section 912 goes too far in this 
regard. Subsection (1) of proposed Section 912 purports to create 
a single exception from the exclusion of these eligible assets from 
the bankruptcy estate.1 n This exception allows the trustee to 
recover transferred assets for the estate under Section 550 "by 
virtue of avoidance under Section 548(a)."'' " The negative 
118. See Plank, supra note 42, at 315-16 (discussing reasons why courts may 
find a purported "true sale" to constitute a secured loan, rather than a sale). 
119. See id. (citing one such instance of a judicially-determined loan). 
120. E.g., Grosshandler Statement, supra note 44 ("Unfortunately, there is a 
lack of guiding judicial precedent regarding what constitutes such a true sale of 
assets .... As a result, for some types of transactions, true sale opinions can be 
extremely difficult, costly, and in a few cases, impossible to render."). According 
to Mr. Grosshandler and some other commentators, the new bankruptcy law's 
empowerment of parties to decide for themselves whether the transaction is an 
asset sale or loan will resolve the uncertainty and significantly reduce transaction 
costs. Id. 
121. Id. Indeed, the parties' own characterization of the transaction may 
conflict with the plain facts and circumstances of the exchange. See supra note 43 
and accompanying text. 
122 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (listing the courts' usual 
criteria for determination, as well as multiple examples of court decisions that 
systematically applied those factors to make the sale/loan determination). 
123. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, 
H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001). 
124. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the 
Bankruptcy Dynamic,supranote 9, at 320 n.185. 
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inference in this language seems to be that these excluded 'eligible 
assets' are beyond the reach of the trustee's other powers to 
recover transferred assets - specifically, those provided for in 
sections of the law other than Section 548.'5 
Section 548(a) avoidance is limited to giving the bankruptcy 
trustee the right to recover for the estate transfers by the debtor 
that are deemed to be fraudulently made within one-year of 
bankruptcy filing.26 The other important avoidance powers include 
Section 544(a)(1), which provides for the avoidance of unperfected 
security interests,' and Section 547, which provides for the 
avoidance of transfers that result in a preference for one creditor 
over all other creditors as a group." In particular, Section 
544(a)(1) allows the bankruptcy trustee to avoid unperfected 
transfers of accounts when the creditor has not "perfected" its 
transfer by a simple notice filing.'29 
As noted above, even in the case of a true sale of accounts, a 
judgment lien creditor would have state law priority in transferred 
account assets when the "buyer" fails to file a financing 
125. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a)(1) & 547(b)(5) (2000). Section 544(a)(1) 
provides: 
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without 
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, any knowledge of the 
trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of 
property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable 
by-
a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of 
the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial 
lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have 
obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists. 
Id. at § 544(a)(1). 
126. 	 Id. §548(a)(1) (according to this Section,
 
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
 
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
 
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
 
involuntarily­
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the 
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted). 
127. Id. § 544(a)(1).
 
12& Id. § 547(b)(5).
 
129. Id. § 544(a)(1). 
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statement.3 ° It is not clear why that same unperfected buyer, 
assuming a true sale of accounts, should be safe from a challenge in 
bankruptcy. The proposed language that makes these federalized 
"true sales" immune from Section 544(a)(1) avoidance is a 
significant departure from bankruptcy law's historic deference to 
state law.'31 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The issues raised by my Panel in the symposium, in many 
ways, track the issues raised in discussions of whether secured 
creditors ought to have full priority in bankruptcy. Unfortunately, 
as is the case with respect to the full priority issue, most of the 
assertions made regarding the wisdom of implemented and 
proposed securitization-related changes are unproven. It is not 
clear whether securitization is efficient or inefficient, nor is it 
proven that changes in the law designed to facilitate securitization 
will result, in the aggregate, in more credit availability. It is 
similarly unclear, even if securitization leads to a greater 
availability of credit, whether the result of the credit infusion will 
stave off bankruptcy or simply postpone it. Nor is it apparent 
whether a securitizing debtor's unsecured creditors, or unsecured 
creditors in the aggregate, will be benefited or injured as a 
consequence of a securitization. What is clear, however, is that 
Bankruptcy Code changes and changes to Article 9133 will alter 
bankruptcy outcomes in ways inconsistent with many of 
bankruptcy's first principles, as well as with the bankruptcy 
system's normative goals distributional fairness. 
There have not been any empirical studies demonstrating that 
the law ought to be changed to further facilitate and protect those 
parties to securitization transactions. Further, there is little case 
law addressing the legal issues raised by these changes and 
proposed changes in the law. Likely due to the market's relative 
130. See supranote 113 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the historical goals 
of bankruptcy legislation). 
132. See Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation, supranote 106. 
133. See generallysupranote 2 and accompanying text. 
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youth, there have not been many bankruptcies of securitizing 
originators. Therefore, courts have not had the opportunity to 
carefully scrutinize the structures of these transactions. As noted 
in Congressional testimony concerning proposed Bankruptcy Code 
revisions affecting securitization: 
[The issues of] the possible harm to the bankruptcy estate and 
other creditors that may result from securitized financings... 
are unresolved, because there have been almost no cases 
addressing the consequences of securitization in bankruptcy. 
There are a handful of unreported opinions and almost no 
reported opinions. We are not learning, because we are not 
litigating. Usually, judicial development of an area gives us a 
full sense of the issues raised by any new practice. It is the 
interaction of case law and legislation that is the genius of the 
American system ......4 
134. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Administrative Oversight and The Courts: Hearings Regarding the Business 
Bankruptcy Act, 105th Cong. (May 19, 1998) (testimony of Randal C. Picker). 
Professor Picker was referring in his testimony to a Senate subcommittee on 
behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference, on the proposed modification of 
the definition of bankruptcy "estate" found in Section 541 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Id. The proposed language addition to Section 541 states that "eligible 
assets" transferred by the debtor in a securitization are affirmatively deemed to 
be excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Professor Picker testified: 
This provision is objectionable. The current existence of a robust asset 
securitization business, coupled with the existence of minimal case law in the 
area, strongly suggest that special Bankruptcy Code treatment is unnecessary. 
The broad definition of "transferred" is likely to cause certain financing 
arrangements to be treated as sales to prevent the debtor's assets from being 
considered property of the estate even through they are only pledged as 
collateral. The proposed provision makes no effort to distinguish those 
transactions properly characterized as "true sales" from those legitimately 
subject to characterization as security interests .... 
Id.
